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CASE COMMENTS
state's interests in that it would place the burden of fair and
beneficial contracting upon the company involved.
However, this statutory solution would impose such uncer-
tainty upon a contractor that he would arguably be unwilling to
enter Butler type agreements. If this proves true, and such
contracts are deemed necessary to the state, it would appear
that the court's case-by-case solution is the only alternative.
It must be recognized, however, that the practical effect of
acknowledging the validity of Butler type contracts is to per-
mit the state to buy a company's services before there are funds
available. This is the type of state spending the Reorganization
Act was enacted to prevent,28 and the considered proposals will
not cure this salient defect.
Since none of the above mentioned dangers were factually
present in the case before them, the court held the contract to
be valid.29 By so doing, the court apparently established a type
of contract to which the provisions of the Reorganization Act
do not apply-subject only to case-by-case judicial intervention
as a means of state fiscal protection. However, since the judicial
arm of government is equipped to punish abuses only after they
have occurred and is relatively useless in averting them, the
prevention of abuses in state financing can be effectively accom-
plished only through the legislative process. Therefore, in the
light of the court's decision in Butler, it would seem that addi-
tional legislation is clearly warranted.
Criminal Law: The Mere Evidence Rule Discarded
Police pursued an armed robber to defendant's house and
were admitted by the defendant's wife. They searched the en-
tire house and found the defendant feigning sleep. An officer
searching the basement found a uniform fitting the description
of the clothes worn by the robber. On the basis of this and
other evidence' the defendant was arrested and convicted in
28. See MImN. STAT. § 16.16 (1965).
29. This narrow view ignores the reasoning so prevalent in otherjurisdictions: "To declare this contract valid by permitting a strained
construction . .. would be tantamount to opening the proverbial Pan-
dora's Box', and before it could again be secured the fiscal affairs of the
State might well decline to a chaotic level. . . ." State ex rel. Point
Towing Co. v. McDonough, 150 W. Va. 724, 730, 149 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1966).
1. Other evidence found consisted of a cap, weapons, and ammu-
nition; however, no stolen property was discovered.
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state court. After proper appeals in the state courts, he sought
and was denied habeas corpus relief in a federal district court.
The Fourth Circuit reversed,2 on -the ground that under the
Mere Evidence Rule the clothing was improperly admitted. The
Supreme Court, finding the search valid as incident to an ar-
rest,3 reversed, discarding the Mere Evidence Rule and holding
that the fourth amendment does not forbid a search for specific
evidentiary material. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Under the Mere Evidence Rule (hereinafter referred to as
the Rule), materials which are not instrumentalities of the
crime, fruits of the crime, contraband, or weapons which might
foster an escape may not be seized by law enforcement authori-
ties even though they are of evidentiary value.4 The Rule was
derived from an old English case which struck down general
warrants 5 as an impermissible intrusion into private homes.6
In dictum the English court indicated that a search for evidence
is illegal where the effect is to cause a man to be a witness
2. Hayden v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647 (4th
Cir. 1966) (divided court).
3. Actually the Court ruled that the search was valid since it was
made while the officers were in "hot pursuit" of the robber. However,
the distinction between a search made incident to an arrest and one
made while in "hot pursuit" is insignificant to this discussion.
4. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947); see Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234-35 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360, 365 (1959); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886).
5. In England general warrants were issued by the secretary of
state for searching private houses for the discovery and seizure of books
and papers that might be used in libel prosecutions. These warrants
were among the primary reasons the framers of our Constitution thought
the fourth amendment necessary. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
363-66 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 11t3 U.S. 616, 625-30 (1886). See
generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND THE SUPREME COURT
19-40 (1966); N. LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CoNsTiTUTIoN 22-105 (1937); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For a discussion of
the origin of the Rule, see Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the
Reason, 54 GEO. L.J. 593 (1966).
6. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). In this case,
suit was brought against the secretary who issued a general warrant
and the officer who executed it. The court found a violation of a prop-
erty right, pointing out that even a search for stolen goods was looked
upon with suspicion and was allowed only if the owner first swore
under-oath that the theft had been committed, that the goods were at a
particular place, and the owner accompanied the officer who executed
the warrant.
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against himself.7 The Supreme Court,s apparently misreading
the case,9 cited it as support for the proposition that the fourth
and fifth amendments, rather than the fifth amendment alone,10
were needed to exclude the evidence." Thus, when the Mere
Evidence Rule was first enunciated in Gouled v. United States, 2
the Court held that the seizure of mere evidence is prohibited
by both the fourth and fifth amendments. 3
The Rule has been criticized by both courts 4 and commen-
tators.15 First, the inadequacy of guidelines for applying the
Rule has made it possible for courts, in order to prosecute suc-
cessfully an obviously guilty defendant, to classify an object as
one of the exceptions to the Rule.', Thus, it has been found that
7. The Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), quotes Entick for the proposition that:
It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself;
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, fall-
ing upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel
and unjust; and it would seem, that search for evidence is dis-
allowed upon the same principle.
Id. at 629 (emphasis added). See Note, Search and Seizure in the Su-
preme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHm. L. REv.
664, 697 (1961), which suggests that the Court saw an analogous danger
in search and seizure as an investigative technique and for this reason
required a warrant based on probable cause.
8. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9. Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on
the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. R.v. 664, 694 (1961).
10. This was the position of the two concurring Justices in Boyd.
The Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and appar-
ently in the instant case, adopted this position. 387 U.S. at 302-03.
11. 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
12. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
13. The Gouled holding was based on Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886); it also relied on Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), insofar as it established the federal exclusionary rule rendering
evidence obtained through an illegal search inadmissible no matter how
relevant.
14. See, e.g., People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 780 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966); State v. Bisaccia, 45
N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965); State v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392
(1962).
15. E.g., Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 HARV. L.
REV. 302, 673, 699 (1922); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties:
Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. Canv. L.C. & P.S. 171 (1962); Kam-
isar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44
MlN. L. REV. 891, 914-18 (1960); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-
Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 478 (1961). But
see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 H-Av. L. REV. 361
(1921); Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEO.
L.J. 593 (1966); Comment, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dimen-
sions of an Initimate Relationship, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 857 (1965-1966).
16. See Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Pro-fessor's View, 44 MNN. L. REV. 891, 917 (1960). Even the Supreme Court
1968]
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the very same papers would constitute fruits or, more often, in-
strumentalities of a crime in some circumstances and mere evi-
dence in others.17 Clothing, altho.gh quite logically mere evi-
dence, has often been classified as an instrumentality by the
lower courts,18 therefore subject to seizure incident to an arrest.
A second criticism is that the constitutional basis for the
Rule that the seizure of evidentiary matter violates the privi-
lege against self-incrimination no longer provides sufficient sup-
port.19 While the Rule applies to all merely evidentiary items,
since 1966 the fifth amendment's protection applies only to evi-
dence that is testimonial or communicative in nature.20
A third criticism of the Rule is that it is based on an old
property concept that the sovereign may seize only those objects
to which the sovereign may assert a claim on grounds that the
objects have been wrongfully obtained,21 wrongfully used,22 or
has avoided the Rule. For example, the Court in Zap v. United States,
328 U.S. 624 (1946), bypassed the Rule by holding that testimony or
even photographic evidence may be introduced at trial concerning ob-jects not subject to seizure.
17. Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), and
Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933) (business records are
fruits or instrumentalities of a crime), with United States v. Thomson,
113 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940), and United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911
(2d Cir. 1930) (same type of documents are mere evidence).
18. See United States v. Caruso, 358 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 862 (1966) (clothing of bank robber); Whalem v. United States,
346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965) (clothing for
identification); Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
(bloodstained clothing in closet). Contra, Williams v. United States,
263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (coat with button missing found in closet);
United States v. Richmond, 57 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.W. Va. 1944) (clothing
for identification).
19. See, e.g., State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965);
Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects, 20 U. Cm. L.
REV. 319, 324 (1954). See also Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual
Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. Cnmw. L.C. & P.S. 171, 177
(1962). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582, 595 (1946), states that "papers of an accused cannot be
seized even through legal process because their use would violate the
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination." Id. at
595.
If fifth amendment protection was the rationale behind the Rule,
reliance upon the fourth amendment was not necessary. See note 10
supra. The protection of the fourth mad fifth amendments developed
separately and are distinct. See J. WiGwoRE, supra note 5, § 2264. See
also Chafee, supra note 15, at 697; Fraenkel, supra note 15, at 366-67.
20. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761-62 (1966).
21. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
22. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment
[Vol. 52:901
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illegally possessed. This concept has been validly criticized23 as
fictional since the principal purpose of the fourth amendment is
to protect privacy, not property.24 Furthermore, objects are
generally not sought or seized to vindicate a property right,
but rather to aid in proving the guilt of the accused. 25
Finally, the rationale that the Rule protects the privacy of
the individual by limiting the search20 has been discredited.27
One court stated that the Rule does not protect privacy by
preventing exploratory searches, but that it simply prohibits the
seizure of mere evidence in the course of any search, with no
regard to the reasonableness or legality of the search.28
In spite of these weaknesses the Rule existed for over forty
years, largely because it was easily bypassed by classifying an
object as a fruit or instrumentality, 29 and because until 1961 it
was used only in the federal courts.30 Then, in Mapp v. Ohio,3 1
the Supreme Court held that the states were obligated under
due process to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure
of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining
information therein contained, or of using them as evidence
against him.... In the one case, the government is entitled
to the possession of the property; in the other it is not....
Id. at 623.
23. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 475-78; Comment, Limitations on
Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects, 20 U. Cur. L. REv. 319, 323-34 (1954).
24. 387 U.S. at 304.
25. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); State v.
Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 508, 213 A.2d 185, 187 (1965).
26. ". .. [L] imitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit
the quest itself. . . ." United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.
1930) (L. Hand, J.). See 387 U.S. at 310-13 (concurring opinion). See
also Comment, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dimensions of an
Intimate Relationship, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rsv. 857, 861 (1965-1966).
27. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 478. The idea that the Rule
limited the quest itself by limiting the search was also indirectly un-
dermined when the Court refused to apply the Rule to wiretap cases-
an area where privacy is certainly invaded and evidence obtained. See
Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View,
44 MwN. L. REV. 891, 914-18 (1960).
28. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 638, 408 P.2d 108, 110, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 780, 782 (1965).
29. 387 U.S. at 308-09.
30. Prior to Mapp, about twenty-five states, including Minnesota,
followed the common law rule of admissibility of evidence at trial even
if it was obtained by illegal search and seizure. See J. WIGmOPRE, supra
note 5, § 2183; Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 535 (1956). In 1963 Minnesota passed
a statute which provided for supression of illegally seized evidence;
Mum. STAT. § 626.21 (1965), but in the same year it passed a statute
which made it clear that a search warrant could be issued to seize
objects of evidentiary value only. lmNm-. STAT. § 626.07 (1965).
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1968]
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Constitution. The possibility created by Mapp that state courts
would be required to follow the Rule increased the confusion
and created the need for a ruling by the Supreme Court.32
In the instant case, after reviewing the improbable inception
of the Mere Evidence Rule and its various criticisms, the Court
stated that it had "spawned exceptions so numerous and con-
fusion so great, . . . that it is questionable whether it affords
meaningful protection. 3 3  The Court pointed out that the dis-
tinction between mere evidence and instrumental fruits of crime
or contraband is not supported by either the language of the
fourth amendment or its principal purpose of protection of
privacy.3 4 In rejecting the proposition that government must
have a property interest in material before its seizure is legiti-
mate, the Court directed lower courts to give due regard to
government's independent interests in solving crime.3  To lend
support to its discarding of the Rule, the Court noted that al-
though the absence of the Rule may somewhat increase the
area of permissible search,36 the fourth amendment still exists
for adequate protection of individual privacy.37
The effect of the instant case on the law of search and
seizure must be viewed in light of its impact on the two basic
areas of permissible search-searches made under a search war-
rant, and those made incident to an arrest.38  Since the
32. Even after Mapp the question as to whether the Rule was to
be given constitutional sanctity was unanswered. See generally Com-
ment, The Mere Evidence Rule: Applicability to the States, 45 N.C.L. REV.
512 (1967). Many state courts indicated reluctance to follow Mapp.
See, e.g., State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W.2d 327 (1963).
33. 387 U.S. at 309.
34. Id. at 301-02. The Court noted that privacy is no more dis-
turbed by a search for a specific object ofi evidentiary value than for a
fruit or instrumentality.
35. Id. at 304, 306. The basic problem in search and seizure is the
great difficulty of balancing two competing values: the right of privacy
and the need for effective law enforcement. Allen, The Wolf Case:
Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 Nw. U.L. REV.
1, 4-5 (1950).
36. Justice Fortas, concurring, 387 U.S. at 310-12, advocated reten-
tion of the Rule to prevent unreasonable exploratory searches. His
concurrence was based on the belief that clothing should be an exception
to the Rule. Justice Douglas, dissenting, id. at 312-25, stated that the
majority decision will open the door to general searches in violation
of both the fourth and fifth amendments.
37. 387 U.S. at 309-10.
38. The right to search without warrant was at first limited to a
search for weapons which the accused may use in an attempt to escape.
See Way, Increasing the Scope of Search Incident to Arrest, 1959 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 261, 263-71. In this century the right to search expanded from
[Vol. 52:901
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instant case involved a "search incident to arrest" in which
officers, after placing a party under arrest, need not stop their
search to obtain a warrant,39 there is no doubt that the Court's
discarding of the Rule affects the scope of this type of search.
The Rule had its greatest value here, since it discouraged the
general ransacking of the arrested person's house.40  Now that
the Rule has been rejected, if a search is "reasonable,"4 1 officers
can seize anything which they reasonably believe is evidence
pertaining to a specific crime for which they are arresting the
person.42 It would appear, therefore, that the decision, in effect,
removes one, if not the only, "restraint" in what was already a
very liberal area of search and seizure.
The effect of Hayden upon searches under a warrant is not
as clear. It can be argued that since Hayden involved a search
without a warrant, any language in the decision which goes be-
yond this issue is dicta and does not change the law in the
search-with-a-warrant area.
the well-established right to search the person of the accused when
legally arrested, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), to
the right to make a thorough five-hour search of the defendant's apart-
ment and the seizure of contraband items totally unrelated to the of-
fence for which the arrest had been made, Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947). See Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:
Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cux. L. REv. 664, 683 (1961).
39. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), laid down a
rule that "law enforcement must secure and use search warrants wher-
ever reasonably practicable." Id. at 705. However, this case was over-
ruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
40. Judge Learned Hand stated that once officers have gained legal
entry by a search incident to an arrest, the practice of ransacking a
man's house for anything that may incriminate him seems indistinguish-
able from what might have been done under a general warrant. United
States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926). Hand went on
to suppress the evidence under the Rule.
41. This apparently means undestructive and with some particular
object in mind. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
42. Any evidence associated with a crime is admissible if found,
albeit unexpectedly, during a "reasonable" search for another specific
piece of evidence. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); see
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). The test is the reason-
ableness of the search itself, not the practicality of procuring a search
warrant. United States v. Rabinowitz, supra at 65-66. It is asserted
that the reasonableness of the search is for the most part determined
by how successful the officers are in their search. As Justice Douglas
recently stated, "whenever a culprit is caught red-handed, . . . it is
difficult to adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose." Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (dissent). But to disregard
an individual's constitutional rights because he appears guilty, or is
later proven to be guilty because of the violation, seems contradictory
to our valued concept of innocent until proven guilty.
19681
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However, if effect is to be given to language in Hayden
which goes beyond the narrow holding allowing seizure of mere
evidence where no warrant is required,43 the case may be inter-
preted to allow seizure of mere evidence in both areas of search.
Under this rule, a warrant could constitutionally be issued to
search for and seize mere evidence.44
For several reasons the broader interpretation of the case
would seem to be more rational. If the Rule is still applicable
to obtaining a search warrant, officers will be even more in-
clined to avoid using a search warrant. Second, the confusion
created by the Rule as to what is or .!s not mere evidence will
still exist. Third, the rationale used by the Court in discarding
the Rule implies that the Court intended its decision to apply
even to searches under a warrant. The Court reasoned that
the Rule could be overthrown because the requirements of the
fourth amendment as to probable cause, particularity, and the
intervention of a magistrate would continue to provide protec-
tion in the area of permissible searches.45 These requirements
of the fourth amendment apply to searches in general, which
includes searches under a warrant. Therefore, the Court appar-
ently believes that if these requirements are met, a search war-
rant can be issued to search for and seize mere evidence.
43. The Court stated that
if its [the Rule's] rejection does enlarge the area of permissible
searches, the intrusions are nevertheless made after fulfilling
the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and after the intervention of a ... magistrate.
." [T] he Fourth Amendment allows intrusions upon privacy
under these circumstances, and there is no viable reason to dis-
tinguish intrusions to secure mere evidence from [other]
intrusions....
387 U.S. at 309-10 (emphasis added). See note 34 supra and accompany-
ing text.
44. Note, however, that the issuance of a warrant must comply with
statutory as well as constitutional requirements to be valid.
Mum. STAT. AxN. § 626.07(5) (Supp. 1967), provides that a warrant
will issue if: "(5) The property or things to be seized consist of any
item or constitute any evidence which tends to show a crime has been
committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed a
crime." This section clearly allows a warrant to issue for mere evidence
alone. If the Rule had been given constitvtional sanctity, this statute
would probably have been unconstitutional and, if the instant case is
narrowly interpreted, it may still be unconstitutional. Even if the case
is broadly read, a warrant would have to meet the requirements of
probable cause and specificity. Another Minnesota statute provides
these requirements. "A search warrant cannot be issued but upon
probable cause, supported by affidavit, . . . particularly describing the
property or thing to be seized, and particularly describing the place
to be searched." MUNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.08 (Supp. 1967).
45. 387 U.S. at 309-10.
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Because the Rule did not actually prevent exploratory
searches, but merely excluded from evidence certain mat-
ter found during any type of search, it was a poor means of
protecting privacy.46 While the discarding of the Rule was prob-
ably reasonable, it does leave a void in the area of search with-
out a warrant. Since police are, after the demise of the Rule,
more likely to extensively search and seize,47 a more stringent
limitation should be put upon the ability of police to search
incident to an arrest 4s and seize evidence 49 without a warrant. °
One possibility would be to return to the rule that law enforce-
ment officers must use search warrants wherever reasonably
practical. 1 Once the officers have arrested a person and made
a cursory search for their own protection, a requirement that
they must obtain a search warrant to search further seems no
great burden. 52 This would give valuable and much needed
protection to the right of privacy without the confusion and ab-
surdities created by the Mere Evidence Rule. The Court has
been striving for a rule to cover all searches, but has been un-
46. 387 U.S. at 304.
47. Police seem inclined to use lawless enforcement if not checked.
Chafee, supra note 15, at 703. This is vividly revealed in Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966), where 300 general searches with-
out warrants were made by the Baltimore police in search of a murderer
in less than a month. In ordering an injunction, the court stated that
the case revealed a series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy ever
to come before a federal court. Id. at 201. See also Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 181-82 (1949) (dissent).
48. For strong criticism of the modern liberality in a search inci-
dent to an arrest, see generally United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
66 (1950) (dissent); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947)
(dissent); State v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 280, 373 P.2d 392, 401 (1962)
(dissent); Way, supra note 38.
49. This ability also exists if the arrest is close to the location that
officers would like to search. See, e.g., Kernick v. United States, 242
F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957) (accused arrested in station with a baggage
check found on his person; contraband found in search of the baggage
which "was under his control"); United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499
(S.D. Cal. 1955) (accused arrested in car, key seized to get into apart-
ment two blocks away where a key was found which opened the garage
in which evidence was discovered).
50. The swearing out of a search warrant requires some probable
cause that a search will be successful. The mere fact that the defendant
was arrested at the place sought to be searched is not, by itself, enough.
It is, therefore, more a lack of grounds than a lack of time which would
prevent police officers from swearing out a warrant. Kaplan, supra
note 15, at 491.
51. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948), overruled
by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950).
52. Also, it seems irrational to allow a more extensive search
without a warrant than can be made with one.
19681
